Did we learn from LLC Side Channel Attacks? A Cache Leakage Detection
  Tool for Crypto Libraries by Irazoqui, Gorka et al.
Did we learn from LLC Side Channel Attacks? A Cache Leakage Detection
Tool for Crypto Libraries
Gorka Irazoqui∗, Kai Cong†, Xiaofei Guoζ , Hareesh Khattri†,
Arun Kanuparthi†, Thomas Eisenbarth∗, and Berk Sunar∗
∗Worcester Polytechnic Institute, ζTetration Analytics, †Intel
Abstract
This work presents a new tool to verify the correct-
ness of cryptographic implementations with respect to
cache attacks. Our methodology discovers vulnerabil-
ities that are hard to find with other techniques, ob-
served as exploitable leakage. The methodology works
by identifying secret dependent memory and introduc-
ing forced evictions inside potentially vulnerable code to
obtain cache traces that are analyzed using Mutual In-
formation. If dependence is observed, the cryptographic
implementation is classified as to leak information.
We demonstrate the viability of our technique in the
design of the three main cryptographic primitives, i.e.,
AES, RSA and ECC, in eight popular up to date cryp-
tographic libraries, including OpenSSL, Libgcrypt, Intel
IPP and NSS. Our results show that cryptographic code
designers are far away from incorporating the appro-
priate countermeasures to avoid cache leakages, as we
found that 50% of the default implementations analyzed
leaked information that lead to key extraction. We re-
sponsibly notified the designers of all the leakages found
and suggested patches to solve these vulnerabilities.
1 Introduction
In the last decade we have witnessed the cloud revolution
enabled by sandboxing mechanisms such as virtualiza-
tion. These technologies allow cloud service providers
to place data and processes of various customers on the
same hardware without jeopardizing their security. IaaS
clouds for instance rent expensive hardware resource to
multiple customers by offering guest OS instances sand-
boxed inside virtualized machines (VMs). PaaS cloud
services go one step further and allow users to share
the application space while sandboxed, e.g. using con-
tainers, at the OS level. Similar sandboxing techniques
are used to isolate semi-trusted apps running on mobile
devices. Even browsers use sandboxing to execute un-
trusted code without the risk of harming the local host.
Resource sharing improves utilization and thereby
helps reducing IT costs and saves power. However, re-
source sharing also enables information leakages at the
hardware level which sandboxing techniques cannot pre-
vent and that can be exploited by malicious code. One of
the most prominent leakage sources, i.e. the Last Level
Cache (LLC), has been heavily targeted. From the ad-
versaries’ point of view, the LLC leakage channel has
a number of advantages, including high resolution in-
formation and cross core information leakage.LLC at-
tacks have demonstrated to recover a wide range of in-
formation, ranging from private cryptographic keys [1]
to user’s private shopping behavior [2]. Furthermore,
LLC attacks have been successfully applied in a wide
range of scenarios, e.g., malicious VMs in IaaS or PaaS
public clouds, malicious Javascript execution in web
browsers [3] or even as malicious smartphone apps [4].
In short, cache attacks have demonstrated to pose a se-
vere threat applicable in a wide range of use scenarios.
These attacks can be stopped at three different layers;
at the hardware [5], the OS/hypervisor [6] or at the ap-
plication layer [7]. While the first two involve overheads
that hardware/OS designers might not be willing to pay,
preventing leakage in security critical applications can be
achieved by aware code designers through proper imple-
mentation techniques. Indeed, cache attacks usually ex-
ploit human coding mistakes that lead to private informa-
tion leakage. Although these leakages might sometimes
be difficult to detect, they need to be carefully verified,
especially when designing cryptographic code. Crypto-
graphic primitives make the core of the security infras-
tructure used to protect our digital communications. If
the used cryptographic code is poorly designed, any so-
lution built on top is also susceptible to fail.
In summary, cache attacks diverge from traditional at-
tacks in the following ways:
• Stealthy: Leakage attacks are extremely hard to
detect. The effects of an attack may only be felt
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through performance degradation for a short dura-
tion while leakage traces are being collected. After
the attack is performed no digital footprint is left.
Hence standard detection techniques such as traf-
fic, access and privilege monitoring are completely
blind to leakage attacks. For instance, any applica-
tion submitted to the app store is checked for access
violations to devices, however, any attack code ex-
ploiting hardware leakage would only monitor le-
gitimate memory access time variations.
• Hard to Prevent: It is rather difficult to design
leakage proof code, especially if good performance
is also an objective. Leakages are quite subtle and
may not be detected after deployment for a long
time. Even if the code is not leaky on one plat-
form, with gradual optimizations implemented at
the microarchitectural level, new leakage channels
may emerge with newer releases of a platform.
• Difficult to Test: Verification of leakage resistant
code is painfully slow and typically requires inspec-
tion by experts well versed in cache attacks.
In this paper, we introduce a tool that helps crypto-
graphic code designers to analyze and expose any leak-
ages in cryptographic implementations. We demonstrate
the viability of the technique by analyzing cache leak-
ages in a number of popular cryptographic libraries with
respect to three main cryptographic primitives we rely
on every day to securely communicate over the internet:
AES, RSA and ECC. In order to achieve this goal, we
first find secret dependent instructions/data with dynamic
taint analysis, introduce cache evictions inside code rou-
tines, record cache traces and then verify the existing de-
pendence with respect to the secret. Our results show
that, despite the efforts of cryptography library designers
in reaction to the multitude of recently published LLC
cache attacks several popular libraries are still vulnera-
ble. Our Contributions.
• This paper presents a proactive tool to analyze leak-
age behavior of security critical code. Unlike other
approaches, our tool can be used to find real ex-
ploitable leakage in the design of cryptographic im-
plementations.
• The tool identifies secret dependent data, obtains
cache traces obtained from the code execution on
the microarchitecture and uses the generic Mutual
Information Analysis (MIA) as a metric to deter-
mine the existence of cache leakage.
• The detection technique is agnostic to the imple-
mentation, i.e. the testing code can be run across all
target platforms without having to redesign it, yet
pinpoints parts of code that cause found leakages.
• We perform the first big scale analysis of popular
cryptographic libraries on three of the most com-
monly used primitives: AES, RSA and ECC.
• We demonstrate that several cache leakages are still
present in up-to-date cryptographic libraries (i.e.
50% still leak information) and need to be fixed.
2 Preliminaries
The proposed tool employs techniques from modern
cache attacks to monitor cache activity and measures in-
formation leakage using Mutual Information.
2.1 LLC Attacks
LLC cache attacks are one of the most dangerous side
channel attacks since they do not rely on physical prox-
imity. Furthermore, these attacks do not require root
privileges and can be executed in user mode. There are
two main classes of LLC attacks:
Flush and Reload Attack The Flush and Reload at-
tack was first introduced in Gullasch et al. [8] but ac-
quired its name in Yarom and Falkner [1], who were able
to extract RSA cryptographic keys across VMs situated
in different cores. This attack was later shown to be suc-
cessful also breaking symmetric key algorithms [9, 10],
TLS sessions [11] or the isolation in PaaS clouds [2] and
smartphone devices [4, 12]. In particular, the attack as-
sumes the following;
• The attacker and the victim are executing processes
in the same CPU but in different cores.
• Attacker and victim share read-only memory pages.
The Flush and Reload attack can only succeed
when attacking memory blocks shared with the poten-
tial victim. These usually imply static code and global
variables, but never dynamically allocated variables.
Prime and Probe Attack The Prime and Probe at-
tack was first introduced for the L1 cache by Osvik et
al. [13] and was later utilized by Ristenpart et al. [14] and
Zhang et al. [15] to recover, in IaaS clouds, keystrokes
and El Gamal decryption keys respectively. Recently the
attack was expanded to attack the LLC by Liu et al. [16]
and Irazoqui et al. [17], and has been successfully ap-
plied in commercial IaaS clouds [18], as Javascript exe-
cutions [3] and as smartphone applications [4]. The at-
tack presents advantages and disadvantages over Flush
and Reload:
• Prime and Probe does not require any memory
sharing between victim and attacker.
• Prime and Probe can increase the attack vector to
dynamically allocated variables.
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• Prime and Probe implies some reverse engineer-
ing to know which sets in the cache the attacker is
using, while Flush and Reload does not.
• Prime and Probe is noisier than Flush and
Reload.
Taking these two attacks into account, we explore the
cryptographic libraries looking for leakages exploitable
by either attack. Thus, we examine both statically and
dynamically allocated memory in our analysis.
2.2 Mutual Information Analysis
The metric that we use to quantify leakage is Mutual In-
formation (MI), that is given by the following equation:
I(X ;Y ) = H(X)−H(X |Y ) = H(X)+H(Y )−H(X ,Y )
Where H(X) is the entropy of random variable X and
H(X |Y ) is the entropy of the random variable X given
the knowledge of the random variable Y . In a way
I(X ;Y ) gives us how related variables X and Y are.
Note that if X and Y are independent, I(X ;Y ) = 0 since
H(X |Y ) = H(X). In contrast, if X and Y are fully depen-
dent we obtain maximum MI, i.e., I(X ;Y ) =H(X), since
H(X |Y ) = 0 (Y fully determines X).
MI has been used in prior work for side channel at-
tacks and leakage quantification. Gierlichs et al. [19] uti-
lize MI as a side channel distinguisher to mount differ-
ential side channel attacks. Standaert et al. [20] utilized
MI as a leakage quantifier to evaluate side channel attack
security. Prouff et al. [21] further expanded on the limita-
tions and strengths of MI as a side channel attack metric.
Recently Zhang and Lee [22] used MI to measure the
security level of several cache architectures which they
modeled as finite state machines.
3 Methodology
Our goal is to determine whether specific memory ad-
dresses being used inside a cryptographic routine reveal
information based on their cache accesses.
3.1 Main Idea
Our approach involves the monitorization of the cache
usage for all the memory addresses considered suscep-
tible of carrying information. In order to achieve this
goal we utilize common known techniques from cache
attacks, like the usage of cache flushing or cycle counter
instructions.
We illustrate our approach on a toy example shown in
Figure 1. The Hello code snippet simply returns differ-
ent messages depending on whether the caller is a fe-
male or a male. We assume that the designer of this
simple code does not want a potential attacker to know
the gender of the caller. Assume that the code design-
ers would like to know whether they did a good job, i.e.,
whether the cache traces do not reveal the gender of the
user. Here, it is easy to observe that there is a gender
dependent branch that could reveal whether the user is
a male or female. We call B1 and B2 the two possible
outputs of the branch. To test the sanity of the code, we
1 void H e l l o ( char ∗ g en de r ){
2 i f ( g en de r ==” Male ” ){
3 male =1;
4 }
5 e l s e i f ( g en de r ==” Female ” ){
6 fe ma l e =1;
7 }
8 }
Figure 1: Vulnerable code snippet example
insert forced evictions at the beginning of the code rou-
tine for those memory references susceptible of leaking
information about the gender, and time the re-access after
its execution, as shown in Figure 2. Then we re-execute
the code routine for several input values, retrieving the
cache traces for all those potentially leaky references.
1 e v i c t ( B1 , B2 ) ;
2 H e l l o (& g en de r ) ;
3 t ime ( a c c e s s ( B1 , B2 ) ) ;
Figure 2: Code snippet wrapped in cache tracer
The cache traces for this simple example are shown in
Figure 3. The x-axis shows the actual gender while the
y-axis represents accesses either to the cache as a 1 or
to memory as 0. The branch outputs are represented with
different colors. Observe that the cache traces match per-
fectly the gender that the code designer is trying to hide.
Thus, this code snippet would be classified as vulnera-
ble. This is because B1 and B2 were located in different
cache lines. However, due to their proximity, it could
have happened that both fall in the same cache line, in
which case the code would be classified as non-leaky.
Although identifying leakages in the toy example did
not seem overly challenging, as the code starts getting
more and more complicated, it becomes increasingly dif-
ficult and time consuming both to find secret dependent
memory and to detect the leakages using manual code
inspection. Particularly difficult to detect are cases in
which the code does not seem to leak, but subtle architec-
tural optimizations at the hardware level make the leak-
age appear [11]. In order to cope with this issues we in-
troduce a tool that automatically finds secret dependent
memory thanks to the properties of dynamic taint anal-
ysis and that automates the analysis of cache leakages
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Figure 3: Results for cache traces obtained from invoca-
tions of Hello for varying inputs. The x-axis shows the
actual gender whereas the y-axis represents cache hit-
s/misses (1 indicates hit, 0 indicates miss). The cache
trace has full correlation with B1 and B2 traces..
through the usage of statistical properties like Mutual In-
formation for number of different inputs. We proceed to
explain the metric and the methodology to identify se-
cret dependent memory locations and to uncover hidden
cache leakages.
3.2 Our approach: MI based Leakage De-
tection
Informally we can summarize our technique as follows:
We first identify, thanks to dynamic taint analysis, po-
tentially leaky pieces in the target code that may com-
promise the secret. For instance, variables and branch
instructions that can reveal information to the attacker.
Then we insert forced cache hierarchy evictions on those
secret related memory addresses prior to the execution
of the targeted piece of code, and accesses after it. These
accesses determine a clear cache fingerprint of the poten-
tially leaky memory addresses. Finally, we correlate the
observed cache trace with the secret to be extracted by
the attacker using Mutual Information. We summarize
the proposed approach in four steps:
1. Identify, through a dynamic taint analysis, suspect
instructions and variables that might reveal infor-
mation related to a secret in the targeted code.
2. Insert forced cache hierarchy evictions just before
the vulnerable targeted code, and accesses after it,
for all the variables/instructions susceptible of leak-
ing secret information.
3. Execute the targeted code under different secret val-
ues, and record the cache traces for every possible
vulnerable variable.
4. Correlate, with MI, the observed cache traces to the
secret value to determine leakage existence.
3.3 The Detection Algorithm
We formalize the detection process as shown in Algo-
rithm 1. The input is the fragment of code that we want
to analyze. First, the first step involves a dynamic taint
analysis to retrieve the potential variables/instructions
that are dependent on the secret the code routine is hid-
ing. For each of them we generate access traces obtained
through the execution of the code for a large number of
secret values. We then compute the mutual information
between the secret value used and access trace obtained
through during an execution of the code. We characterize
the code as to leak information if the average mutual in-
formation is above a predefined baseline threshold. We
should note that two critical steps require code inspec-
tion: identification of the suspect variables/instructions
and how the secret will be processed during MIA. Split-
ting the key requires understanding of the cryptographic
algorithm. To improve detection rates we split the key in
a way that mimics key is processing in a particular library
(more details in Section 4).
Algorithm 1: MI based leakage test
1 function DoesItLeak (C);
Input : Code C
Output: True: the code leaks;
False: the code does not leak
2 L = ListSecretTaintedMemory(C);
3 for each vi in L do
4 trace = [ ], M = [ ];
5 for each key = 〈k0,k1, . . . ,k`〉 value do
6 evict(vi);
7 execute(C, key);
8 trace.append(time(vi));
9 M.append(MI(trace, 〈k0,k1, . . . ,k`〉);
10 end
11 if M.average> threshold then
12 return True;
13 end
14 end
15 return False;
3.4 Secret Dependent Memory Detection
using Dynamic Taint Analysis
In this work, we use dynamic taint analysis to effectively
identify suspect instructions and variables. In the past
decade, dynamic taint analysis has been widely explored
in many research areas, including malware analysis, vul-
nerability detection, program debugging and data leak
4
protection [23, 24]. Dynamic taint analysis is a powerful
approach to track the propagation of sensitive program
data such as user inputs.
To detect key dependent memory for crypto libraries,
our dynamic taint analysis retrieves two kinds of infor-
mation. First, we collect all branch instructions affected
by the taint inputs. Second, we collect all memory object
information that is accessed with a taint value as index.
We illustrate our approach on a toy example shown in
Figure 4. The encrypt function takes user input and en-
cryption keys, and returns out including encrypted data.
The encrypt function checks key and decides which
variable is used for encryption and invokes compute
function to compute output. In the encrypt function,
variable key is marked as taint inputs. Then we exe-
cute the program using our taint analysis engine. The en-
gine can easily identify that Line 8, variable index (Line
13) and variable A (Line 14) are our desired information.
This does not mean that all three memory addresses will
leak information; in fact, the variable index will not leak
information as it is used in both cases. Our taint anal-
ysis outputs secret dependent data that might not leak
information, and thus has to be verified with cache trace
analysis.
1 s t a t i c i n t A[ ] = {0x1 , 0x2 , 0x3 , 0x4 } ;
2 s t a t i c i n t B = 0x5 ;
3
4 void e n c r y p t ( i n t ∗ in , i n t ∗out , i n t ∗k )
5 {
6 i n t i n d e x
7 f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i < 6 4 ; ++ i ) {
8 i f ( k [ i ]>=32) {
9 i n d e x = 0 ;
10 compute ( in , out , B ) ;
11 }
12 e l s e {
13 i n d e x = k [ i ] % 4 ;
14 compute ( in , out , A[ i n d e x ] ) ;
15 }
16 }
17 }
18
19 void main ( )
20 {
21 i n t key [ 6 4 ] , ∗ in , ∗ o u t ;
22 g e t i n p u t (&key , in , o u t ) ;
23 s e t t a i n t (&key , 64 , ” key ” ) ;
24
25 e n c r y p t ( in , out , key ) ;
26 }
Figure 4: Taint analysis example
We employ a symbolic execution engine KLEE [25]
as our taint analysis engine. The target program is com-
piled into a LLVM intermediate representation, and then
executed by the taint analysis engine to collect suspect
instructions and variables.
3.5 Collecting the Cache Traces
We collect the cache usage for those memory locations
that our dyncamic taint analysis outputs during differ-
ent executions for varying secret inputs of the targeted
code. In order to mimic the attacker ability to insert
evictions, and due to its high resolution, we utilize the
common cache flushing and timing approach typically
utilized in LLC attacks. In short, we insert forced flushes
(with the clflush instruction) for those variables that
have a dependency with the key before the targeted code,
and timed accesses after it. These timing measurements
are later converted to 0s and 1s, compared to a pre-
defined memory access threshold, indicating whether
these memory addresses were retrieved from the cache
or from the memory. These cache traces are later corre-
lated using MI statistical properties to derive dependen-
cies with the secret to hide.
3.6 Dealing with noise
Although our methodology works best in an environment
with minimal unintended noise coming from co-resident
processes, our measurements will still suffer from the
omni-present microarchitectural/ OS noise. In that sense,
the threshold (see Algorithm 1) for which an implemen-
tation will be considered to be leaky has to be established
taking into account these unintended noise sources. Aim-
ing at correctly categorizing the leakage, we perform a
set of identical measurements to those carried out for the
cryptographic primitives to an always used variable un-
der microarchitectural noise. Note that the variable is
always cached and thus it should not present any leak-
age. Our goal is to see how minimum microarchitectural
noise affects to the measurements that will later be taken
for the cryptographic primitives. The results of 100 MI
calculations under minimal microarchitectural/OS noise
on datasets containing 105 cache access times can be ob-
served in Figure 5. Our noise threshold will follow the
famous three-sigma rule of thumb [26], although one can
use any statistical method that fits best to the approach
taken. Finally we note the threshold we set via experi-
mentation is rather conservative. This stems from the fact
that cache access timing measurements are susceptible
to have false negatives, while memory accesses timing
measurements do not show false negatives. Therefore,
microarchitectural noise tends to affect timing measure-
ments by increasing the measured time, but rarely reduc-
ing it.
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Figure 5: 100 MI measurements each composed of 105
time accesses to a cached variable. Our noise threshold
is set to µnoise+3σ
4 Evaluated Crypto Primitives
We restrict our evaluation to three of the most widely
used crypto primitives: AES, RSA and ECC. Note that
this methodology can be extended to any cryptographic
software code. However, for brevity we only focus on
these three primitives. Note that each cryptographic
primitive has its own leakage behavior. Different imple-
mentations of the same cryptographic primitive may also
result in very different leakage behavior. Our analysis ex-
cludes the quantization of the number of measurements
needed by an attacker to exploit the leakage. Indeed, we
believe code designers should aim at designing leakage
free code without taking into account the attacker ex-
ploitation effort. Our analysis was performed on both
Intel Core i7-6700K Skylake and Intel Core i5-650 Ne-
halem processors. However, the leakage we found does
not seem to be architecture dependent, except those for
which the cache line size affected the leakage. Since
the cache line size is 64 bytes in the three most widely
used processors, i.e., Intel, ARM and AMD, our analysis
should detect the same leakages in other processors.
4.1 AES
Across the cryptographic libraries evaluated, we found
three different AES implementations. The AES-NI im-
plementation will be excluded from the analysis, since
it is a pure hardware based implementation. We are left
with two techniques to implement AES:
• T-table implementation: The algorithm utilizes
256 entry tables, each entry holding a 32 bit value.
• S-box implementation: The algorithm utilizes a
single 256 entry table for the whole encryption,
each entry holding an 8-bit value [27].
T-Table/
S-box
P0
K10 T-Table/
S-box
S90
K100
C0S
1
0
FIRST ROUND LAST ROUND
Figure 6: First and Last round of an AES encryption. In
both cases, the entry to the T-table/S-box is influenced
by the key and the plaintext/ciphertext
Some implementations also might use a combination
of both approaches, e.g., T-tables in the first rounds and
S-box in the last. Note that these represent only the
implementations we encountered across the libraries we
evaluated, but are not the only implementation options
of AES. For instance, AES routines may utilize S-box/
T-table free implementations, which compute the inverse
in Galois field mode without pre-computed tables.
Customizing for AES Leakage Detection: For AES,
the approach we follow is:
• the plaintext is fixed;
• for different key byte values we record different
cache traces of our potentially leaky variables; and
• the traces and the key bytes are correlated
However, note that we can also fix the key and randomize
the plaintext input byte, since in the first round the T-
table entry access is influenced by both the plaintext and
the key bytes (see Figure 6). Similarly, we can apply the
same concept in the last round and compute the MI of
our cache traces with the last round key bytes or with
the ciphertext bytes, since again the last round T-table
access is influenced by both the ciphertext and last round
key bytes (Figure 6). This might be convenient in cases
where the last round is handled differently than the first 9
rounds and leaks more information than the first. In this
work, we compute the MI test in both the first and last
rounds, and select the one that leaks more information.
We restrict our analysis to 105 and 107 encryptions.
This restriction allows us to test AES leakages in at
most a few hours. Furthermore, cache side channel at-
tacks performed against AES have succeeded with fewer
number of traces than those we require in our analysis,
c.f. [9].
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4.2 RSA
The second cryptographic primitive that we evaluate is
RSA, the most widely used public key algorithm. RSA
can be implemented in several ways, including by using
the Chinese Remainder Theorem, with and without ci-
phertext blinding or exponent blinding. The only imple-
mentation that would completely stop cache and other
side channel attacks from recovering meaningful infor-
mation is exponent blinding, since a different exponent
is used for every decryption. However, we have not seen
any cryptographic library using exponent blinding. RSA
leakages can come from any key dependent execution or
memory usage during the modular exponentiation.
Customizing for RSA Leakage Detection: Across all
the libraries evaluated in this work, we found that there
are two main (and distinct) ways in which crypto libraries
implement modular exponentiation in practice:
• Bitwise modular exponentiation: The algorithm
processes the key and executes all the squaring and
multiplication operations bit by bit. This means, in
our detection algorithm we can split the key into bits
and then correlate with MIA with traces collected
over the entire RSA encryption.
• Windowed modular exponentiation: The
algorithm first precomputes a set of val-
ues (b0,b1,. . . ,b2
w−1 for fixed window,
b2
w−1
,b2
w−1 − 1,. . . ,b2w−1 for sliding window)
that are stored in a table. Then, the key is processed
in chunks of at most w bits. For each chunk,
at most w squares are executed together with a
multiplication with the appropriate window value
in the precomputed table, see Algorithm. Our
detection algorithm therefore, is customized to split
the key into fixed/sliding windows which are then
correlated via MIA with access traces collected
over the entire windowed RSA encryption.
Our analysis consists of observing leakage at the decryp-
tion process for 100 different 2048 bit decryption keys.
Note that, unlike AES, RSA leakages are visible with
much fewer encryptions since the algorithm leaks seri-
ally bit by bit. AES on the contrary needs aggregated
measurements to derive the table entries utilized.
4.3 ECC
The last cryptographic primitive we analyzed is Ellip-
tic Curve Cryptography (ECC). We utilize Elliptic Curve
Diffie Hellman (ECDH) as opposed to Elliptic Curve
Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) because in the lat-
ter the secret operation is performed on an ephemeral
key, which limits our analysis capabilities. Note that this
does not imply that the leakage observed for ECDH will
Cryptographic Library Version
OpenSSL 1.0.1-t
wolfSSL 3.9.0
Intel Integrated Performance Primitives (IPP) 9.0.3
Bouncy Castle 1.8.1
LibreSSL 2.4.2
Mozilla Network Security Services (NSS) 4.13.0
Libgcrypt (NSS) 1.7.3
mbedTLS 2.3.0
Table 1: Cryptographic libraries evaluated
not be present in ECDSA, since both algorithms use the
same implementation techniques in all the libraries ana-
lyzed. As before, we utilize 100 different 256-bit private
keys.
Customizing for ECC Leakage Detection: The scalar
point multiplication implementations we found are very
similar to those observed for modular exponentiation:
• Bitwise Double and Add: The algorithm processes
the secret scalar bit by bit and executes double and
add operations accordingly. In the detection algo-
rithm the key is split into bits and then correlated
with access traces obtained over a scalar point mul-
tiplication computation using MIA.
• Windowed algorithm: Similar to the case of
RSA, the algorithm first pre-computes the set of
values (P,2P, ... . . ,(2w − 1)P for fixed window,
(2w−1)P,(2w−1+1)P,. . . ,(2w−1)P for sliding win-
dow and (P,3P,. . . ,(2w−1−1)P for wNAF) that are
stored in a table, being w the window size. Then,
the algorithm processes the secret scalar in chunks
of at most w bits. For each chunk, at most w dou-
blings are executed and an addition with the appro-
priate value of the window in the precomputed ta-
ble. The detection algorithm splits the key into win-
dows and is correlated with access traces obtained
over a scalar point multiplication using MIA.
4.4 Cryptographic libraries evaluated
Our evaluation is restricted to 8 popular up-to-date (at the
time of the leakage evaluation) cryptographic libraries,
represented in Table 1. The analysis can be extended to
other cryptographic libraries with mild effort.
5 Results for AES
In this section we present the results obtained for AES
implementations for different libraries. Due to space
constraints, we do not include all the results analyzed,
but rather examples of every kind of implementation.
The complete results are summarized in Section 8.
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Figure 7: AES MI leakage in a) wolfSSL and b) NSS. The leakage is observable at 105 encryptions in both cases.
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Figure 8: AES S-box implementation MI leakage in a) OpenSSL and b) Libgcrypt. None of them leak information.
5.1 T-table based AES (wolfSSL,
mbedTLS, NSS & Bouncy Castle)
wolfSSL, mbedTLS, NSS and Bouncy Castle utilize T-
table based implementations to perform AES encryp-
tions. We only include examples for wolfSSL and NSS.
Note that the results obtained for the other libraries are
similar to the ones obtained for wolfSSL and NSS shown
in Figure 7a and Figure 7b, respectively. For both cases,
the T-tables were classified as key dependent accesses
and leaked information. Observe that in both cases the
leakage is already observable at 105 encryptions, and that
wolfSSL seems to leak more information than NSS. This
is because wolfSSL uses a different T-table for the last
round, while NSS re-uses the first 4 T-tables in the last
round. In consequence, the probabilities are more dis-
tinguishable in the case of wolfSSL. In both cases the
leakage is above our noise threshold thus leading to key
recovery attacks after a small number of encryptions.
5.2 S-Box based AES (OpenSSL, LibreSSL
and libgcrypt)
In this case we analyze those implementations that utilize
a single 256 entry S-Box in the AES encryption. As be-
fore, we only show the results obtained for two of them,
since the results obtained for the rest are very similar. In
this case, the results for OpenSSL and Libgcrypt are in-
cluded in Figure 8a and Figure 8b, respectively. In both
cases, the S-boxes accesses were flagged as key depen-
dent, but the leakage results were not higher than our
noise threshold, and as such are categorized as non-leaky
implementations. In the case of OpenSSL, we observe
that the S-Box entries are prefetched to the cache prior
to the encryption. Libgcrypt utilizes the approach de-
scribed in [28], i.e., they use vector permute instructions
not only to speed up the AES encryption but further to
protect against cache attacks.
6 Results for RSA
Similar to the measurements taken for AES, we proceed
to test the robustness of the RSA implementations ob-
served across our evaluated libraries. The three main ap-
proaches found were:
6.1 Montgomery Ladder RSA (WolfSSL)
WolfSSL is the only library that utilizes Montgomery
ladder to perform modular exponentiations. This imple-
mentation attempts to prevent the leakages coming from
8
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Figure 10: Sliding window RSA leakage for a) wolfSSL and b) mbedTLS. Magenta indicates instruction leakage, blue
indicates instruction+data leakage. WolfSSL leaks from both possible sources (instructions reveal zeroes between
windows, data accesses reveal window values) and mbedTLS only leaks from the precomputed table accesses.
simple square and multiply approaches. Our results show
that, among others, squaring or multiplying instructions
and key storing registers are key dependent. The results
for these are shown in Figure 9, where instruction leak-
age is presented in magenta and data leakage coming
from the registers in blue. We observe 0 MI for these
(or any) instructions involved in the modular exponen-
tiation process leak information. However, in the case
of the registers, we see that the MI is 0 for most of the
keys, except for some for which it increases to almost 1,
the maximum entropy. These measurements cannot be
outliers, since even if a noisy measurement is observed,
it should not output an almost maximum MI. Thus, af-
ter inspecting this particular behavior, we realized that
the MI was high only when the variable R0 started at a
cache line boundary. If it does not, then there is data
allocated in the same cache line that is used regardless
of the key bit (fetching the R0 cache line always to the
cache). This behavior is represented in Figure 9b. Note
that the alignment of the register R0 is controlled by the
OS, and usually changes from execution to execution. In
consequence, a potential attacker only needs to keep iter-
ating until observing a trace for which R0 is aligned with
a cache line boundary. Our methodology was able to find
this particular cache alignment dependent leakage, which
would not be observable without empirical cache traces.
6.2 Sliding Window (wolfSSL, mbedTLS,
Libgcrypt & Bouncy Castle)
WolfSSL and mbedTLS utilize sliding window ap-
proaches, which require the window to start with a 1 bit.
For these implementations, squaring and multiplications
and the pre-computed table were flagged as key depen-
dent. Results for these are shown in Figure 10a and Fig-
ure 10b, where instruction leakage is shown in magenta
and the instruction + data leakage is shown in blue. We
found instruction leakage in wolfSSL due to the usage of
the multiplication function, revealing the zeroes between
windows. Accesses to the precomputed table also leak
information, revealing the window values being used. In
the case of mbedTLS we only found table entry accesses
9
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Figure 11: Leakage for fixed window RSA in a) OpenSSL and b) IPP. Magenta indicates instruction leakage, blue
indicates instruction+data leakage. OpenSSL does not leak information (scatter and gather approaches correctly used),
while IPP leaks varying amount of leakage for different decryption keys (although scatter and gather is used)
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Figure 12: Cache structure difference for aligned and misaligned precomputed table when using scatter and gather
approaches. Observe that when misaligned, an attacker monitoring set 0 can retrieve when c3 is being used.
to be non-protected. In both cases (easier in the case
of wolfSSL), an attacker monitoring the cache would be
able to retrieve the key [18, 16].
6.3 Fixed Window (OpenSSL and IPP)
OpenSSL and IPP utilize fixed window approaches to
perform modular exponentiations, wich executes a con-
stant number of squares and multiplications for every key
value. We include the approaches taken by OpenSSL and
IPP as examples. The results are presented in Figure 11a
and 11b. In OpenSSL, we observe that neither the key
dependent instructions nor the data leakage is above our
noise threshold, i.e., our test categorizes it as non-leaky
implementation. One of the reason, among others, is that
OpenSSL uses a scatter and gather approach [29], i.e., ci-
phertext powers are stored vertically in the cache and not
horizontally. Thus, each cache line contains a little bit of
information of each of the ciphertext powers, as seen in
Figure 12a. This technique ensures that all the ciphertext
powers are loaded whenever one is needed. However,
other covert channels might exploit this approach [30].
We found no instruction leakage in IPP. In contrast,
varying data leakage coming from the pre-computed ta-
ble was observed for different keys. To better under-
stand this counter-intuitive behavior, we investigated the
code. We realized that IPP uses a similar approach to
OpenSSL, but the scatter-gather precomputed table is not
always starting in a cache line boundary, i.e., there is
no alignment check when the table was initialized. In
consequence, the OS chooses where the table starts with
respect to a cache line, i.e., it is not deterministic. Fig-
ure 12b, in which the table starts at a 1/4 of a cache line,
helps to illustrate the problem. An attacker monitoring
set 0 obtains cache misses whenever c0, c1 and c2 are
utilized, but cache hits whenever c3 is used. Thus, she
can detect when window 3 has been utilized by the expo-
nentiation algorithm. If the table is created at the middle
of a cache line she can recover when window 2 is being
used (since she already knows when 3 is used). Thus, a
divide and conquer approach leads to a full key recov-
ery. In contrast, OpenSSL performs an alignment check
in the precomputed table.
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7 Results for ECC
The following are the four main implementation styles
that we encountered for ECC implementation
7.1 Montgomery Ladder ECC (wolfSSL &
Libgcrypt)
Only WolfSSL and Libgcrypt implemented this ap-
proach. Results are presented in Figure 13b. In the case
of Wolfssl, we only found data leakage coming from
the key dependent register accesses. Unlike the behav-
ior observed in RSA (in which the cache lines could
make the implementation not to leak), the ECC imple-
mentation presents leakage for every key. The results for
Libgcrypt indicate no presence of leakage because it uti-
lizes a temporary variable on which the computations are
performed, and then the contents of it are placed in the
corresponding registers in constant execution flow.
7.2 Sliding window ECC (wolfSSL)
The default implementation in wolfSSL uses a sliding
window approach, very similar to the RSA implementa-
tion. The results are shown in Figure 14, displaying in
magenta the instruction leakage and the instruction plus
data leakage in blue. We observed that the implementa-
tion leaks from both the add instruction, which reveals
the zeroes between windows, and from the accesses to
the precomputed table, which reveal the window values.
Once again, the ECC implementation of wolfSSL leaks
enough information to reveal the secret key.
7.3 Fixed Window ECC (mbedTLS,
Bouncy Castle, NSS)
As with RSA, fixed window implementations process the
key in fixed w sized windows. We present two exam-
ples, mbedTLS and Bouncy Castle, for which the results
are shown in Figures 15a and 15b. Surprisingly, we do
not observe any instruction or data leakage in the case of
mbedTLS, while we did observe for RSA. One of the dif-
ferences with respect to the RSA implementation is that
mbedTLS accesses all the precomputed table values in
a loop before using one, and they choose it in constant
execution flow. The fact that their ECC algorithm is well
designed but their RSA algorithm is not is surprising. In
the case of Bouncy Castle, we do not observe leakage
from the instruction side, but we observe leakage in the
accesses to the key dependent precomputed table that al-
lows an attacker to recover the key.
7.4 wNAF ECC (OpenSSL & LibreSSL)
OpenSSL and LibreSSL utilize the wNAF scalar multi-
plication method. To reduce the number of non-zero dig-
its, wNAF works with signed digits, ensuring there are at
least w+1 zeroes between two non-zero digits. Then the
key is processed in a loop, doubling always and perform-
ing additions/ subtractions whenever a non-zero digit is
found. The results for OpenSSL’s implementation are
shown in Figure 16, where addition instruction leakage is
shown in blue, addition instruction + precomputed table
entry leakage is shown in green and the additional sign
change instruction leakage effect is shown in magenta.
As we can see, the addition instruction already gives us
the zero values, the leakage from the precomputed table
accesses give us the window value and the sign change
function gives us the sign of the window value. Thus,
OpenSSL a big door for ECC key recovery attacks.
8 Leakage summary
This section summarizes the leakages found in the cryp-
tographic libraries analyzed. The results for all the de-
fault (marked in bold) and some non-default implemen-
tations are presented in Table 2. The third column in-
dicates whether the implementation leaks the secret or
not. We found that 50% of the default implementations
were susceptible to key recovery attacks (i.e. 12 out of
24). We believe these numbers are alarming especially
given the popularity cache attacks have gained over the
last few years. These numbers underline the need for
a methodology, like the one proposed in this work, that
cryptographic code designers can utilize to detect leak-
ages before the libraries are released to the public.
9 Comparison with Related Work
Our work is not the first attempt to detect cache leakage
in software binaries. For instance, Zankl et al. [7] use the
PIN instrumentation tool to detect instruction leakage in
RSA implementations. Demme et al. [31] use simulated
cache traces to define a correlation-based side channel
vulnerability factor of different hardware characteristics.
Almeida et al. [32] defined a generic constant time se-
curity definition and verifies constant time implementa-
tions. Our work differs from them in the following:
• We proposed a sophisticated tool that combines
taint analysis with automatic code insertion to track
cache leakages of analyzed code while being exe-
cuted in a realistic environment. We make use of
several modern techniques such as the flush and
reload technique, taint analysis and mutual infor-
mation to make the tool efficient and easy to use.
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Figure 13: Montgomery Ladder ECC leakage for a) wolfSSL and b) Libgcrypt. Magenta indicates instruction leakage
while blue indicates instruction+data leakage. Instructions do not give us any information in neither case. Register
accesses give us the full key in wolfSSL
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Figure 14: Sliding window ECC leakage in wolfSSL.
Magenta indicates instruction leakage, blue indicates in-
struction+data leakage. Both sources leak information.
• The SVF proposed in [31] uses correlation be-
tween an ideal memory-access trace and an cache-
observable trace, every time for the entire analyzed
code. This means that constant execution flow code
will still feature high correlation on leaky archi-
tectures, even though the code is not vulnerable.
Hence, SVF is a metric for comparing hardware ar-
chitectures, but cannot be used to find leaking code.
• Like [7], our tool looks for dependencies between
secret variables and observed leakages to find vul-
nerabilities. We chose mutual information over cor-
relation, as mutual information is more generic as
it does not only look for linear relations and is as
easy to implement. Furthermore our work evaluates
both instruction and data leakage, while [7] only an-
alyzes instruction leakage, mainly due to the limi-
tation of the proposed PIN based approach to find
dynamic memory leakage.
• Unlike [7, 32] our methodology takes into account
microarchitectural features such as cache line sizes
1Due to Intellectual Property conflicts, we are not allowed to dis-
close the approach taken by the library
2We verified with OpenSSL that while the 1.0.1 branch leaks, the
1.1.0 branch does not leak
Table 2: Leakage summary for the cryptographic li-
braries. Default implementations are presented in bold.
Cryptographic Primitive Library Outcome
AES
OpenSSL (T-table) Leaks
OpenSSL (S-box) No leak
WolfSSL Leaks
IPP (v1)1 No leak
IPP (v2)1 No leak
LibreSSL (S-box) No leak
NSS Leaks
Libgcrypt No leak
Bouncy Castle Leaks
MbedTLS Leaks
RSA
OpenSSL (Sliding W) Leaks
OpenSSL (Fixed W) No leak
WolfSSL (Montgomery L) Leaks
WolfSSL (Sliding W) Leaks
IPP Leaks
LibreSSL No leak
NSS No leak
Libgcrypt No leak
Bouncy Castle (Sliding W) Leaks
MbedTLS (Sliding W) Leaks
ECC
OpenSSL (WNAF)2 Leaks
WolfSSL (Montgomery L) Leaks
WolfSSL (Sliding W) Leaks
IPP1 No leak
LibreSSL Leaks
NSS No leak
Libgcrypt No leak
Bouncy Castle (Fixed W) Leaks
MbedTLS (Fixed W) No leak
that can affect the code’s resistance to cache attacks.
This is particularly important to expose leakages
caused by OS data cache line missalignments, as
those described in Section 6.3 and 6.1, which are
not observable without empirical cache traces.
• Compared to [7, 32], our methodology detects ex-
ploitable leakage, as demonstrated by our discov-
ered 12 vulnerabilities that are being fixed. In con-
trast, [32] does not expose new vulnerabilities (it
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Figure 15: ECC leakage in mbedTLS and Bouncy Castle. Magenta represents instruction leakage and blue represents
instruction+data leakage. MbedTLS does not leak while Bouncy Castle leaks information from the precomputed table
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Figure 16: wNAF ECC OpenSSL results. Blue shows
addition instruction leakage, magenta adds precomputed
table entry leakage and green adds sign change leakage.
All possible sources leak information
would simply mark all analyzed libraries as non-
constant execution flow, i.e., generates lots of false
positives) while [7] only exposed one.
10 Conclusion
We introduced a proactive tool to detect leakage in secu-
rity critical code before deployment. The tool uses cache
traces for secret dependent memory obtained from exe-
cution of the code on the actual microarchitecture and
uses the generic Mutual Information Analysis (MIA) as
a metric to determine cache leakage. The detection tech-
nique can be run across all target platforms without hav-
ing to redesign it, yet pinpoints parts of code that cause
found leakages. We used the detection technique to per-
form the first big scale analysis of popular cryptographic
libraries on the three most popular crypto-primitives,
namely AES, RSA and ECC. Our results show that about
half of the implementations leak information through the
LLC. Worse still, a tool like ours can also be used by
malicious parties to find exploitable vulnerabilities with
ease. This proves the need for cryptographic libraries to
resist cache attacks, which can be aided by using the pro-
posed tool in real-life security software development.
11 Responsible Disclosure
We disclosed our findings to the cryptographic library
designers, resulting thus far in the following CVEs:
• IPP: CVE-2016-XXXX.
• WolfSSL: CVE-2016-XXXX, CVE-2016-XXXX
and CVE-2016-XXXX.
• BouncyCastle: CVE-2016-XXXX.
The fixes for the remaining issues found in this study
will soon be available to the public.
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